Because the United States relies on private insurance for financing health care to a much greater degree than do other nations, and because managed care as a form of private insurance is further developed in the United States than elsewhere, it is arguable that we have little to learn from other nations about managed care regulation. This Article tests this hypothesis with respect to Chile, a country where private insurance is widespread and managed care is emerging. It concludes that by studying the experience of other nations we might gain a larger perspective on the context of our concerns in regulating managed care, in particular appraising more soberly the difficulties we face in regulating private health insurance markets; understand more fully the importance of attempting the difficult task of regulation; and appreciate more completely our responsibility for sharing with the rest of the world our insights into managed care regulation. We may even find regulatory tools that others have created that might help us with our tasks.
INTRODUCTION
What lessons can we in the United States learn from other nations about how to regulate managed care? At first glance it would appear that there is relatively little to learn. The United States' system of health care finance is so idiosyncratic that the rich experience of other nations in designing health care systems is largely inaccessible to us.
To begin, a nation cannot have regulation unless it has a private sector to regulate. A government manages a national health insurance program; one does not regulate it. While virtually every country in the world has a private health insurance industry, in most places private health insurance plays a very different role than it does in the United States.' In countries with universal public Medici (1996) . While these nations have followed United States developments in managed care and managed competition with interest, and their health care reforms in some respects resemble United States models, their reforms are based very much on their own distinctive ideologies and histories. health care costs in the United States and because they are being aggressively marketed throughout the world by persons from the United States. 14 Other countries are at least beginning to think about how to regulate managed care if and when it arrives. There may be lessons to learn, therefore, if we look beyond our borders.
If we choose to look beyond our borders, the most productive direction to look is south. In South America private health insurance is becoming increasingly common. 5 One of the most useful South American countries to consider is Chile. Chile is perhaps the only nation in the world whose constitution guarantees its residents a right to purchase private health insurance. Article 19, No. 9 of the 1980 Chilean Constitution provides:
The Right to Health Protection
The State protects free and equal access to actions for the promotion, protection, and recovery of health and for rehabilitation of the individual.
The coordination and control of the activities related to health shall also rest with the State. A primary duty of the State is to guarantee the execution of health activities, whether provided by public or private institutions, in the manner and under the conditions established by law, which may provide for mandatory payments.
Each person shall have the right to choose the health system, whether State or private, that he wishes to join. 16 This right is by no means merely theoretical. Currently 3.8 million persons, about 26% of the Chilean population, and 32% of the workforce, are privately insured by thirty-three Chilean ISAPREs (Instituciones de Salud Previsional), private health insur-
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See Jost, supra note 13, at 705-09; see also JOHANN BEHRENS ET AL., GESUNDHEIT- [VOL. 32:4 ance companies. 7 In 1995, 42% of total Chilean health expenditures of U.S.$2.653 billion came from the private sector." i The ISAPREs are not managed care organizations. Some of them have for some time owned their own health care institutions, however, or have had preferred provider arrangements with doctors.' 9 At least two ISAPREs, moreover, have recently begun to develop managed care plans that resemble more closely health maintenance organizations or point of service plans in the United States. °T he ISAPREs have been supervised since 1991 by the Superintendencia de Instituciones de Salud Previsional (SISP), an active and aggressive regulatory agency. The SISP both develops norms for the private health insurance industry and actively supervises compliance with these norms. 2 It also, as is described below, serves as an arbitrator when beneficiaries come into conflict with their insurers. 22 This Article is about regulation of private health insurance in Chile-about the ISAPREs and the SISP. More broadly, however, it is about the lessons that comparative law and policy may hold for an examination of the regulation of managed care in the United States. For while it is true, as asserted above, that we may have relatively little to learn from other countries regarding managed care, we can learn something. Indeed, we can learn four things.
First, at the macro level, we can gain perspective on the issues that have become the focal points of our national managed care regulation debate. Managed care is, in the end, a form of insurance. Much of the debate regarding managed care regulation, at least at the popular level, has focused on very specific problems, 23 such as gag rules and the definition of an emergency. It may be helpful for us to seek a broader perspective, returning to the fundamental issues of insurance regulation-dealing with moral hazard, cream skimming, insurability, and rate-setting, for
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See RuBi VALENZUELA MAGANA, SUPERINTENDENCIA DE INSTITUCIONES DE SALUD PREVISIONAL, THE PRIVATE HEALTH SYSTEM IN CHILE 6, 9 (1996) example. Considering the issues with which Chile is struggling in regulating health insurance may help us to gain perspective on our own issues. In particular, observing the difficulties Chile has faced in regulating private health insurance should help us to be more modest in our expectations of insurance regulation. Most specifically, the Chilean experience cautions us to have modest expectations of what is achievable through the use of regulation as a strategy for expanding insurance coverage.
Second, in contrast, Chile's experience also demonstrates the necessity of health insurance regulation. Some have argued in recent years that health insurance markets would function more efficiently if insurers could sell their products directly to consumers with minimal regulatory oversight. 2 4 Some, including Senator Breaux, the leader of the Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare, have even argued that we ought to replace our public insurance programs with a system under which beneficiaries would be given vouchers with which to shop for private health insurance. 2 5 Chile has essentially done this, allowing Chileans to use their payroll tax contributions to purchase private insurance in what were until recently largely unregulated sales transactions. 26 Chile's experience offers little hope to those who see this route as benefiting consumers.
Third, at the micro level, there is always the possibility that when we examine another system we can gain from the transfer of regulatory technology. In constructing our own regulatory systems, we can turn to the regulatory programs of other lands as a craftsperson goes to a toolbox, looking for instruments to assist us in getting our job done. 7 Chile, like other countries, has developed its own regulatory tools that we might use as we improve the design of our own systems.
Fourth, we may learn where and how we might usefully teach. Our consideration of other nations that are confronting the emer-
24.
See RICHARD [VOL. 32:4 gence of managed care might give us a useful perspective on our own enterprise, in this symposium in particular and on the development of regulatory instruments for managed care in general. Though the United States is increasingly an importer of consumer goods, we are just as clearly an exporter of ideas. United States ideological and business entrepreneurs are marketing managed care, both as an idea and as a product, throughout the world. 28 To the extent that we can design effective, efficient, and equitable approaches to regulating managed care, we have a responsibility to share these ideas in all corners of the world where United Statesstyle managed care is taking root. Pondering the emergence of managed care elsewhere in the world may remind us of this responsibility.
Before developing these themes further, however, let us first turn to Chile and its health care system.
I. THE CHILEAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

A. Some History
We all remember Chile from social studies, that long thin country that runs for 1800 miles down the southern half of the western coast of South America in the narrow strip of land between the Andes and the Pacific. Chile has 14.5 million residents, with 84% of the population living in urban centers, the most important of which is the capital, Santiago, where 4.9 million live. 29 Though the disparity of wealth distribution in Chile between the richest and the poorest quintiles of the population is similar to that of the United States, 0 the average per capita income is one-seventh that of the U.S.; therefore a smaller proportion of the Chilean population lives in relative comfort than in the U.S., and a larger proportion lives in poverty. 31 Chilean indicators of well being, however, such as nutrition, 2 access to potable water, education, 34 and adult liter-35 acy are quite positive. Health statistics are also favorable: Chile's infant mortality rate of thirteen per 1000 and life expectancy at birth of seventy-five years are the best in South America and com- 36 pare favorably to those of the United States. Ninety-seven percent of Chilean children are immunized; 97% of births are professionally assisted. 7 Chile has long been a leader in Latin America, and indeed in the world, in public health care. As early as the nineteenth century it established public health institutions to address the problem of communicable diseases. 6 It adopted a law providing for health coverage under Social Security along the lines of the German Bismark model in 1924, though coverage under this system was always limited. 39 During the 1940s, white collar workers established their own separate social security-type health care system, the Servicio Medico Nacional de Empleados (SERMENA), which by the 1960s had evolved into a preferred provider system under which members could obtain care from private providers who contracted with the system.-
31.
In In 1952, Chile began to implement a National Health Service, the Servicio Nacional de Salud (SNS), resembling the British NHS, which used social security payroll taxes and general tax revenues to finance a system of public hospitals and clinics, as well as basic public health services. 1 Salvador Allende, a physician who was Minister of Health at the time of the creation of the SNS, led the drive for 42 establishing a health service.
In 1970, Allende was elected president of Chile as a Socialist. In 1971, the Chilean Constitution was amended to establish the State's responsibility for "medical care, both preventive and curative, [and] rehabilitation in case of accident, illness or maternity ...
."43 By the time President Allende was overthrown in a military coup in 1973, Chile had two established models for public health care financing: SERMENA, which provided curative health services to white-collar workers and their families (25% of the population), and the SNS, which provided preventive services to the entire population and curative services to blue collar workers and indigents. 4 4 Chile has always also had, of course, a purely private health care sector, where persons who did not qualify for or chose to seek care outside of a public system could purchase care on a fee-forservice basis. 45 The country has also long had separate health care systems for the military and the police, as is commonly true in Latin America. 46 The Pinochet military government that followed the coup settled quickly on a course of reform for the health care system. The military government, heavily influenced by the free market ideology of Milton 
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See Cifuentes, supra note 40, at 63. care. Though Pinochet's approach to reform remains controversial, it is generally agreed that the Chilean health care system required reform in the early 1970s." 5 The system was suffering a huge deficit attributable to overspending by the services and difficulties in collecting payroll taxes from employers. 49 The government health services were also burdened by a costly, overcentralized, and inflexible administrative structure. 5 0 The health services were subject generally to a lack of investment' Moreover, the Pinochet government was not solely concerned with economic efficiency. Its commitment to libertarian ideals was accompanied by a commitment to improving health care for the very poor and to improving preventive and primary care generally. 5 1 The Pinochet reforms were implemented slowly; full implementation did not take place until the early 1980s.-5 3 First, the SNS and SERMENA were eliminated by Pinochet and two new government health care entities were formed in their place (both under the Ministry of Health), the Fondo Nacional de Salud (FONASA) which finances health care, and the Sistema Nacional de Servicios de Salud (SNSS) which delivers health care. 54 The SNSS is organized in twenty-six regional autonomous services, plus the Environmental Health Service of Santiago. 5 These services operate hospitals providing curative services and supervise the provision of primary care. Second, in 1980 and 1981, management of public primary care facilities-postas (basic primary health centers) and consultorios (better equipped primary care clinics)-was trans-
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SeeJimenez & Bossert, supra note 37, at 207-08.
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B. The Public Health Care System
All employees and self-employed persons who contribute to the social security pension system, as well as indigents, are covered by FONASA, unless they elect private insurance coverage. 58 All FONASA beneficiaries can choose either to receive services in public facilities (for which they must pay copayments based on a sliding scale related to income ranging from 0% to 50%) or to purchase vouchers that allow them to receive services in FONASA's network of private preferred providers. 5 9 Approximately 82% of FONASA services are received in public facilities, and 18% in private facilities under the preferred provider system. 60 FONASA is financed by payroll taxes (currently set at 7% of income), general revenue funds, fees from the sale of vouchers, and fees from the sale of health care services. 6 '
FONASA pays for services provided to its beneficiaries by the regional SNSS and municipal primary care centers. 6 Historically FONASA paid hospitals based in part on budgets which covered labor, investment, and other fixed costs, and in part on a fee-forservice system which covered other operating costs. 63 Primary care services were financed on a fee-for-service basis, supplemented by revenues from the municipalities, which in particular covered investment costs. 64
56.
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Chilean public health care finance is currently undergoing a thorough reform, under which primary care is being purchased on a capitation basis and secondary and tertiary care on a diagnosisrelated group basis. 65 Legislation that would further reform the system was before Parliament at the time this Article was written. 66 An exploration of these reforms is beyond the scope of this Article. The complexity of these reforms, however, and the impressiveness of the thought that has obviously gone into them, demonstrates the seriousness of Chile's commitment to maintaining a public health system as a viable alternative to the private sector. This commitment is also demonstrated by the massive investment in public health expenditures following the end of the military dictatorship in 1991. The national health budget increased 50% in the four years following the restoration of democracy, and U.S.$500 million was invested in infrastructure and equipment for the public hospitals. 6 7 Though the public sector remains subject to criticisms for waste and inefficiency,6 and is plagued by shortages and waiting lists, 69 beneficiaries are relatively satisfied by the services they receive there. 76
C. The ISAPREs
The ISAPREs that were created in response to the 1981 reforms are private health insurance companies. Most are owned by small groups of investors, though two are public corporations, and one is 65.
See RONY [VOL. 32:4
Managed Care Regulation a cooperative. 7 ' Seventeen of the currently operational ISAPREs are open to any applicants, while eleven are closed ISAPREs, whose membership is limited to employees of sponsoring companies or industries. The vast majority of ISAPRE members, 3.7 of 3.9 million, are members of open ISAPREs. 75 The market is highly concentrated, with three ISAPREs containing over 60% of the open ISAPRE beneficiaries, and four more containing an additional 24%. 74 Most of the ISAPREs function as traditional insurers. 75 A few of the ISAPREs, however, have for some time provided as well as paid for health care,.while other ISAPREs have long had preferred provider arrangements. Consalud, the largest of the insurers, owns thirty-five primary care and dental clinics, two hospitals, and five ambulatory surgical centers. 7 ' Although Consalud beneficiaries have free choice of physicians and are not limited to Consalud facilities, about half of the ambulatory care paid for by Consalud is provided in its centers. 8 Consalud is also able through its centers to assert some control over referrals to secondary and tertiary care-thus maintaining full use of capacity in its own hospitalsand to refer patients to other providers with whom it has agreements with respect to price and quality. 79 
71.
See In fact, patients seeking care usually first secure a voucher from their insurer by paying the copayment and take the voucher to the provider, who then bills the insurer for the service based on the voucher. See Interview with Franciso Quesney Langlois, supra note 71. The system thus functions quite differently from traditional indemnity insurance in the United States, under which the patient pays the provider first, then seeks indemnity from the insurer.
76 
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Banm~dica, the third largest ISAPRE, also has an integrated structure, though it is structured differently. While Consalud owns its clinics and other institutions, Banmtdica is owned by a parent company, which also owns a share in several health care providers. o Banmtdica has historically not attempted to steer its insureds towards its facilities, and only about a quarter of its beneficiaries use its facilities. 8 ' However, Banmtdica has recently formed an HMO in cooperation with a Santiago hospital. This HMO, which now includes about 8000 members, requires its members to choose a gatekeeper primary care physician (an internist or pediatrician) from a closed panel list and to obtain their care from the hospital (Clinica Ddivila) and from three outpatient clinics affiliated with the plan. 3 A third managed care possibility is represented by Vida Tres, a small but affluent ISAPRE, which is developing three point-ofservice plan type arrangements with a local hospital and two managed care plans. 4 Vida Tres will pay these plans on a capitated basis for insureds who elect them.' The insured will be required to choose an internist, gynecologist, or pediatrician as a gatekeeper physician. 8 ' The insureds will not be limited to care within the plan, but payment for care received outside the plan will be so minimal that few will elect it.
Finally, a number of the ISAPREs have long had preferred provider arrangements, under which insureds have lower coinsurance obligations if they go to professionals or hospitals that have a contract with their plan. 7 Chile has a strong ideology and tradition of free choice of provider, however, and ISAPREs have been reluctant to place too strict limits on choice. 8 Managed Care Regulation further hostility. 89 More integrated forms of managed care are, therefore, developing slowly and quietly in Chile. Any employee, pensioner, or other person may purchase a health insurance policy with an ISAPRE using his or her 7% health insurance payroll tax and whatever additional premium may be necessary, if the applicant can find an ISAPRE willing to sell him or her a policy. 9 0 ISAPREs are aggressively marketed by in-house sales agents, who are paid on a commission basis. 9 1 A person who purchases insurance from an ISAPRE is no longer covered by FONASA, the public default program for employees, as of the effective date of the insurance policy-he or she has moved from the public to the private sector of health care finance."
ISAPREs have no obligation to accept an applicant for insurance. 93 Moreover, they may only vary premiums based on age and sex (and coverage of plan) for those applicants whom they insure. 94 ISAPREs, therefore, often refuse to sell insurance to, or charge high rates to, the elderly or persons with cancer or other costly diseases. 9 Once a person is insured by an ISAPRE, however, the power balance between the insured and insurer to a degree reverses. After one year an insured can leave an ISAPRE at any time with two months notice, but an ISAPRE cannot terminate an insured who has not otherwise breached the terms of the insurance policy. 96 An ISAPRE likewise may not raise the rates that it charges any single insured member. If it wants to increase premiums, it must raise the rates equally for all persons insured under a particular plan and must give two months notice of such increases. 9 7 A person who chooses to be insured by an ISAPRE must continue to pay 7% of his employment income as the insurance 89.
SeeStockeretal., supranote 10, at 1135. An employer may supplement the 7% with an additional amount of up to 2% for poorer workers and claim a tax credit for the contribution, resulting in a modest, though symbolically important, public subsidy for the ISAPRE system. 100 The application of a uniform flat percentage premium makes sense in the context of a universal social insurance program, where it permits cross-subsidization of poorer beneficiaries by wealthier beneficiaries. 1 0 ' This rationale does not apply to the private ISAPREs, however, where cross-subsidies are anathema. If a 7% minimum premium requirement makes any sense in this context, it is to discourage underinsurance. In fact, however, it is just as likely to result in inefficient overinsurance in situations where it results in an excessive payment. It also has in the past caused problems when a beneficiary's income increased temporarily during a coverage period, resulting in increased premium payments without increased benefits. 0 3 The insurance statute was amended in 1995 to permit up to 10% of the 7% premium, including any money paid over the premium price, to be placed in a type of medical savings account held by the ISAPREs to be used for payment for health services, including copayments, additional health benefits, or continuation of coverage in case of unemployment or upon retirement. 4 ISAPREs are permitted to charge handling fees for these accounts, however, and these fees are often large enough to make the account of little value. 1 0 5
Though most ISAPRE policies are purchased by individuals, 35 to 40% are negotiated as collective policies covering a firm's employees as a group. 06 Collective policies tend to offer more favorable coverage for many employees than individual policies because the proportion of the premium devoted to sales and underwriting costs is lower, higher income employees subsidize lower income employees (though there are often several benefit levels within collective plans for' different levels of employees), and collective policy negotiators tend to drive a harder bargain with the ISAPREs."°" Some ISAPREs are unenthusiastic about collective policies, however, because the freedom of movement guaranteed beneficiaries allows higher income employees to opt out of collective plans, undermining the underwriting assumptions on which the plan was based.108
An ISAPRE policy must cover both the insured and his or her spouse and children.' 9 ISAPREs may also agree to cover additional dependents, such as parents, though this is not common. ll Where both spouses work, they may either have separate policies or may purchase marital policies, for which the premium is based on the average wage of the two spouses."' A family may not be split between FONASA and an ISAPRE-if one spouse is privately insured the entire family must be."'
ISAPREs are required to cover each of the services covered by FONASA and under recent regulations must also cover these services at least to the extent that they would be covered under FONASA. 
SUMtMER 1999]
University of MichiganJoumal of Law Reform cosmetic surgery (for the purposes of beautification, not of repair of malformation), nursing care at home or in institutions, or services required because of war or criminal conduct." 5 They may only impose waiting periods for pregnancy and preexisting conditions." 6 Costs associated with pregnancy need only be covered proportionately to the amount of time remaining in the pregnancy at the time of admission to the ISAPRE, i.e. a woman becoming insured with three months remaining in her pregnancy would be covered for one third of her maternity costs. 1 1 7 Under recently issued regulations, preexisting conditions must be covered fully after eighteen months. 8 Prior to the end of the eighteen months, at least one quarter of costs must be covered. 9 ISAPRE policies are commonly subject to significant coinsurance obligations, though ISAPREs do offer full coverage policies to those willing to pay for them. 12 0 Copayments average a little over 30% for most insureds, though a small percentage of insureds with high costs of care pay almost 50%.121 More importantly, coverage is almost always subject to caps, both globally and service by service. 12 Historically, these caps have not been expressed in readily understandable terms of pesos or UFs but by reference to a separate company list of general coverage specifications, which is not readily available. Insurers may have, therefore, only a vagues understanding of their coverage.
ISAPREs not only cover medical care, they also pay for sick leave. In fact, ISAPREs spend about 18% to 23% of their claims-related 115 Managed Care Regulation expenditures on medical leave. 123 ISAPREs must pay sick leave if a doctor certifies an insured to be unable to work. 1 2 4 Until 1990 the ISAPREs were also responsible for maternity leave, to which a pregnant woman is entitled from forty-two days before the birth until eighty-four days after. 2 5 As of 1990, the state took over responsibility for the cost of maternity leave. 1 2 6 Even not considering pregnancy leaves, however, working women request sick leave twice as often as men, contributing to the preference of ISAPREs for insuring men rather than women. 127 It is also widely believed that fraudulent certification of sick leave presents a significant problem. 1 28
Most of the ISAPREs are for-profit entities. 29 They are, on average, quite profitable. Profits can be evaluated two different ways: as a proportion of income, or as a return on investment. Profits as a proportion of income have been quite modest in recent years, averaging about 5%.130 Profit as a return on investment has been much higher, averaging 25% in 1994 and 1995.' 3 ' Profit varies considerably among ISAPREs, however, with larger ISAPREs tending to make much higher profits than smaller ISAPREs. Because profit is relatively small compared to operating costs, moreover, it is very volatile, with some ISAPREs experiencing large losses in 133 some years.
ISAPREs Working in tandem, the characteristics of the ISAPRE system described to this point result in the peculiar nature of the Chilean ISAPRE system. First, ISAPRE coverage is skewed towards the wealthier members of society. The average monthly wage of ISAPRE members in 1997 was about U.S.$700, while the average wage of FONASA beneficiaries (excluding indigents) was U.S.$250.1 36 Over 33% of ISAPRE members earn more than U.S.$830 a month, and over 63%, more than U.S.$400. 1 3 7 This is not surprising; indeed, private insurance is relied on throughout the world to permit persons of means to opt for a higher level of services than that provided through social insurance systems, and the Chilean system in particular was designed to reserve the publicly subsidized health system for the less fortunate. In fact, the remarkable thing about the ISAPRE system is not that it is skewed to the wealthy, but rather that it extends so far down into the population and covers people of such modest means. Over one third of ISAPRE members earn less than US$400 a month, which means that their 7% premiums equal less than US$28 a month, unless they are supplemented by the employer or employee. It is also to Chile's credit that privatizing health insurance for the wealthy has not meant the abandonment of the public health insurance program, which in fact has received relatively generous increases in support in recent years.139
A second characteristic, however, is that coverage is skewed toward young, healthy males. ISAPRE coverage drops dramatically upon retirement (indeed, as early as fifty-five Managed Care Regulation over, and only 2.7% are pensioners."" Some ISAPREs will not accept applicants who are over a certain age, and all charge higher premiums (two to four and a half times the rate of a middle-aged person) to the elderly.' As noted above, women of child-bearing age also have a difficult time securing ISAPRE coverage in their own right, in part because of their higher use of sick leave. Sixtynine percent of ISAPRE primary insured individuals are men.142 Women are much more likely to be insured as dependents of insureds, because dependents cannot receive sick leave, but in the prime child-bearing years between twenty and thirty-five only about 46% of total ISAPRE beneficiaries, including primary insureds and dependents, are women. 43 Once women reach age thirty-five, they are as likely to be insured by ISAPREs as men.144
A third characteristic of the ISAPRE system is its bizarre multiplicity of health care plans. A health care plan is a particular policy covering a particular configuration of services, coinsurance, and caps, marketed by a particular ISAPRE.' 45 Though it is difficult to discover the number of health care plans that exist within the ISAPRE system, the number is truly enormous. Persons within the Superintendency estimate that 10,000 plans existed, with 1000 or so available at any one time, but individuals affiliated with particular ISAPREs with whom I spoke estimated that their ISAPREs alone have thousands of plans. 46 This great number of plans exists for two primary reasons. First, the multiplicity allows exquisite price discrimination. The statutory 7% premium is a continuous variable, because the level of wages varies continuously. Each ISAPRE, thus, must offer a large number of plans so that at any premium, corresponding to 7% of any given wage level, a variety of choices is available. One expert estimated that if premiums were allowed to vary from 6.5% to 7.5%, 80% of the plans would disappear.
I 7
The second reason is a peculiar form of indirect experience rating that grows out of the ISAPREs' response to the legal prohibition against direct experience rating. This law, as stated above, 14 requires that ISAPREs must raise premiums across the board for an entire plan if they want to raise rates at all, and prohibits raising premiums for individuals who require expensive medical care. It is widely believed that ISAPREs do in fact raise premiums, sometimes dramatically, for plans with which they have negative experiences, but then create new plans that closely resemble the old plan and offer them to persons that have a favorable claims experience under the old plan." 9 Thus high cost insureds pay more or leave the plan while less costly insureds move to new plans, permitting indirect experience rating but also adding to the multiplicity of plans. Defenders of the ISAPRE system believe that the multiplicity of plans signifies healthy competition and promotes consumer choice. Skeptics believe, however, that the multiplicity of plans makes true comparison among insurers difficult, if not impossible. 150 This is particularly true because coverage limitations are often expressed in terms of internal insurance company schedules that are difficult to locate and understand. 5 ' The fact that health insurance is sold only by agents of particular companies, rather than by independent agents marketing a variety of policies, makes comparison even more difficult.
A fourth characteristic of the system is that it covers primary care services much more effectively than it does catastrophic care. The ubiquitous presence of caps for most services and of overall caps makes ISAPRE insurance coverage of limited use for catastrophic conditions, though ISAPREs also make catastrophic policies available-for a price. 152 [VOL. 32:4
Managed Care Regulation countries that have national health services, i.e., as a supplement to rather than a substitute for the NHS coverage.154 When ISAPRE beneficiaries require catastrophic care, they always have the option of returning to the public FONASA program by canceling ISAPRE coverage.' 5 5 Indeed, FONASA does not know precisely whom it covers, and it is widely believed that ISAPRE members routinely receive services in SNSS hospitals at FONASA expense once their ISAPRE caps are exceeded, even though this technically is not permitted except in emergencies. 156 FONASA serves, therefore, as a reinsurer for those insured by the ISAPREs.
A final characteristic of the ISAPRE system, therefore, is that a significant cross-subsidization takes place between the public and private sectors. Subsidization clearly flows from the public to the private sector in several respects. The public sector bears the cost of maternity leave and immunization and other public health programs for ISAPRE as well as FONASA beneficiaries. 1 1 7 ISAPRE premiums and disbursements are exempt from taxation (as are those of FONASA), but additionally, up to 2% of employer contributions to ISAPREs above the 7% premium can be exempt from taxation for low income insureds, a benefit not available to FONASA members. 15 8 Moreover, as just noted, FONASA subsidizes the ISAPREs by providing care to their members in catastrophic cases.
On the other hand, the ISAPREs also subsidize the public sector, though the subsidies are less obvious. First, many professionals who work in the public sector also provide care on a fee-for-service basis ' 59 to ISAPRE beneficiaries. Many of these professionals make the bulk of their income in the private sector and deliver care for much lower compensation in the public sector. In fact, the IS-APREs have generally made a significant contribution to the development of a private health infrastructure in Chile, freeing up SUMMER 1999]
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public health facilities to treat public beneficiaries.6 0 Second, some believe that the reported higher rates of physician visits by ISAPRE members compared to publicly insured patients may be in part due to fraudulent receipt of ISAPRE benefits by persons who are in fact publicly insured. 161 Controls over the receipt of ISAPRE-financed services appear to be quite ineffective.
II. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM CHILE
A. The Difficult Task of Insurance Regulation
First, understanding the Chilean experience with regulation of private health insurance can give us a broader perspective on our own task. In particular, it reminds us of the universal nature of the game between the insurer and insured that insurance represents and of the difficult but necessary task that regulators must play to referee that game. Insurance exists because most of us are risk averse. We would rather face a certain but manageable cost in the present than the cost of a much greater but uncertain future risk, even if in the end the amount we pay now to avoid that risk exceeds the cost of the feared risk itself, adjusted for the probability of incurring the risk. 162 We prefer to pay a fixed insurance premium every month and to rest in the certainty that if and when we face major medical bills they will be covered by our insurance.1 3 Insurance companies, on the other hand, are willing to accept premiums from large numbers of insureds in exchange for accept- The law of large numbers permits insurers to pool a large number of uncertain individual risks into a highly predictable obligation. 16 5 They can only perform this function, however, if the premiums they collect are sufficient in size to cover the costs of the insured losses, administrative costs (including marketing, underwriting, claims processing, and other costs), and a reasonable profit. 166 The task of insurance rate-setting is to establish a premium that can cover a defined benefit package plus administrative costs and profits for a particular insured.1 7 While both parties to the insurance contract benefit from this exchange, the relationship is inherently problematic. First, there is the problem of adverse selection resulting from asymmetry of information. '8 The insured may have a better understanding of his or her risk exposure than does the insurer and thus faces a financial incentive to use this information to secure greater coverage for a given premium than would be actuarially warranted given the actual risk faced by the insured. 6 9 The woman who suspects that she is pregnant or the man who has recently experienced chest pains may purchase insurance policies without disclosing their current situation, and thus gain the favorable premiums offered to healthy persons.
Health insurers have a fairly standard armamentarium of weapons with which to combat adverse selection. They exclude, either permanently or for a set time, coverage of certain diseases, commonly including conditions that pre-exist coverage, or at least that have resulted in diagnosis or treatment before coverage commences. 7 They insure groups of employees, which are likely to present fairly good risks because group members are working, are . 164. That is to say, insurers both accept the transfer of and pooling of risk. See ABRA-HAM, supra note 162, at 2. 166. See ABRAHAM, supra note 162, at 106-10. Because risk averse individuals are by definition willing to pay a premium that is larger than the expected value of a potential loss (i.e., the product of the probability of the loss occurring times its magnitude should it occur), insurance companies can in fact charge premiums sufficient to cover these costs. See id. at 2. With respect to some types of insurance where payment for a loss occurs sometime after the loss is incurred (e.g., liability insurance), the insurance company also must take into account investment income gained from invested premiums. See id. at 107. 167. One of the tasks of insurers, therefore, is risk allocation-determining the level of premium that is proportionate to the degree of risk posed by each insured. unlikely to include many persons seeking insurance solely because of likelihood of illness, are often large enough to spread risk fairly broadly, and cost less to insure than individuals in terms of underwriting and marketing costs. 1 7 ' Finally, insurers often require disclosure of medical history and medical records or medical examinations by approved physicians to screen out unhealthy applicants.1 7 2
Two can play at the risk transfer game, however, and insurers often engage in cream skimming, seeking to attract insureds who will cost relatively little given the premiums they are willing and able to pay and to exclude high risk insureds altogether.1 73 Though insurers usually know less about the individuals who seek insurance from them than the individuals know about themselves, insurers can be relatively confident that younger persons are better risks than older persons, that young men are better risks than young women, and that insured employees become riskier over time. 7 4 Alternatively, insurers set their rates through tiered, experience, and durational ratings to make certain that higher risk insureds 175 pay their own way through higher premiums.
Once they obtain insurance, insureds face the temptation to use their insurance coverage to the maximum extent possible to get the full benefit of their policy. This is the problem of moral hazard. 7 7 The problem of moral hazard takes on peculiar characteristics in the health insurance arena, because there are really two parties that benefit from health insurance: insureds and the providers who care for them. Both face incentives to take advantage of insurers, but providers are often a greater threat to insurers than insureds. Few persons intentionally become ill to take advantage of their health insurer; indeed, most persons would prefer not to have to go to doctors or hospitals. Providers who are paid on a fee-for-service basis, on the other hand, have every reason to want to provide as many and as expensive services for their 171 [VOL. 32:4
Managed Care Regulation insured patients as possible. 178 Again, asymmetry of information problems come into play. The provider often knows more about the insured's condition than does either the insurer or the insured and can use this information to take maximum advantage of both.
Moreover, when, as in Chile and in some other countries with social insurance, the health insurer is responsible for sick leave pay, the insured faces more direct and immediate incentives to take advantage of the insurer. 79 As noted earlier, 8 0 there is widespread belief that sick leave insurance is widely abused in these countries by employees who are dissatisfied with their work, or simply do not feel like working.' 8 1
Health insurers have a range of traditional tools for dealing with moral hazard. Cost-sharing, in the form of deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance, is perhaps the most common.182 Utilization review of discrete services provided to particular patients is another. 8 3 Statistical review of the caseload of particular providers is a third. 184 Caps on coverage, a fourth strategy, place a limit on the insurer's aggregate exposure to the demands of any particular insured, on a service by service basis or in total. 8 5 Managed care is primarily, from the prospective of the health insurer, a tool for addressing the problem of moral hazard. 8 6 In less rigorous forms of managed care this is done through utilization review; through the withholding of funds to cover, in part, the cost of tests, referrals, or hospital admissions; or through the granting of bonuses if such costs are avoided. In the strongest forms of managed care, where capitation is used, the provider's incentives are aligned with the insurer to limit the potential of moral hazard on the part of the insured. 179. When Bismark originated the German health insurance system in the nineteenth century, its primary purpose was to provide income rather than health care for sick workers. 
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The primary role of insurance regulation has traditionally been to assure that insurers play the game fairly."" 8 The specific form that such regulation takes will depend on the basic ground rules under which the insurance system operates. In Chile, for example, the premium for health insurance is more or less fixed at 7% of income, while the benefit package varies widely; in the United States premiums vary widely while the benefit package is more standard. Where, as in the United States, managed care becomes common, underprovision of care becomes a serious regulatory concern. Underprovision is, of course, much less of an issue for insurance regulators in a fee-for-service environment.
The most basic task of regulators is to assure that insurers are able to pay for unexpected events as they occur-that they are solvent."" In Chile this is accomplished through requirements that insurers meet minimum capital requirements and deposit a guaranty equaling one month's worth of benefits payments collected with the SISP.' 90 The SISP also regularly and frequently audits the ISAPREs to assure their continued financial responsibility.' 9 '
The regulator can also attempt to control the use by insurers of various devices that address adverse selection or moral hazard to protect insureds from overreaching or to protect particular insureds or classes of insureds from discrimination. Thus, in Chile, the law prohibits the total exclusion of coverage for most medical conditions, forbids the imposition of waiting periods in most instances, restricts the use of categories other than age and sex for rate setting, and limits the use of preexisting condition clauses and restrictions on the coverage of expenses related to pregnancy.192
The first lesson to be learned from the Chilean experience, however, is that as long as one is functioning in a market for private insurance and operating under a basic principle of freedom of contract, there are real limits on how much regulation can accomplish, particularly if the intent of the regulation is to expand insurance coverage. Managed Care Regulation insurance regulator limits the use of preexisting conditions clauses or exclusions of conditions but does not guaranty access to private insurance, insurers can simply refuse to deal with persons who are sick, old, or of child-bearing age. If, as the Chilean experience demonstrates, a regulator requires insurers to guarantee renewability of insurance for persons already insured, insurers will be more selective as to whom they insure and will find ways, if possible, to drive away insureds who are proving to be expensive. 93 In the end a private insurer will, and must, find ways to limit both whom it insures and the risks that it insures. Though attempts to limit the options available to insurers for doing so may be justified on grounds of fairness, they will also usually result in distortions elsewhere in the market and sometimes be of marginal value to those whom they are intended to protect. This is confirmed not only by the Chilean experience, but also by our own experience with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 94 and with various state insurance reforms. 19 5 In the end, private health insurance schemes cannot assure equitable access to health care for all, no matter how they are regulated.
The message here for managed care regulation is that we are likely to meet the same barriers in attempting to regulate insurers' attempts to limit moral.hazard that Chile has encountered in attempting to regulate the responses of insurers to adverse selection. There is some truth in what insurers in the United States have been saying loudly and insistently: managed care regulation comes at a cost. 196 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform hazard, the cost of insurance will certainly increase and its availability will certainly decrease. With respect to each proposal for regulation of managed care, and in particular proposals directed at expanding coverage or benefits, we must attempt to discover how much the proposal is likely to cost, on whom the cost will be imposed, and whether the cost will exceed the benefit. Certainly in some instances the benefit will justify the cost, but the calculation cannot be avoided and must always be made.
B. The Necessary Task of Insurance Regulation
While Chile's experience cautions us to be sober and modest in our expectations of regulation, particularly regulation intended to expand access and coverage, it also demonstrates the problems caused by largely unregulated insurance markets. In recent years advocates of free markets have been very effective in convincing the public and policy makers that regulation is more often than not counterproductive. 197 Though it has long been argued that health care markets are more in need of regulation than other markets, free market advocates have recently begun to argue that even here regulation is generally unnecessary and harmful. 9 s Some have even argued for the privatization of public programs, by giving program beneficiaries vouchers and then allowing them to use these vouchers to purchase private insurance in private markets'9
Chile has in fact privatized part of its social insurance programs insofar as Chileans can take the 7% of their wages formerly dedicated to social health insurance and use it to purchase private insurance. Until recently, the insurance purchase transaction itself was largely unregulated. Insurers had to provide a minimum benefit package but were otherwise largely unregulated in their premiums, cost sharing requirements, exclusions, coverage terms, and sales practices. 2 0 0 The result was a situation in which many conestimate of the Lewin Group that 400,000 persons would lose health insurance coverage for every 1% increase in premiums, which again has been widely quoted, is too high. [VOL. 32:4
Managed Care Regulation sumers were underinsured,"' some were overinsured ,2° many had large gaps in coverage, 2 03 and most were thoroughly confused and uncertain as to what their insurance would actually cover. Had the public system not continued as a safety net, many Chileans would undoubtedly have found themselves without resources to pay for needed medical care.
In the recent past Chile has moved toward a form of managed competition, attempting to limit exclusions and cost-sharing through regulation and to produce useful comparative information. The SISP has attempted to assure that insureds have at least the possibility of understanding the contract that the insurer is offering them. It has promulgated regulations requiring insurers to use a common chart to present comparable information as to the extent of their coverage of fifty-three procedures, including services that together account for 80% of the ISAPREs on health services, plus representative, high cost catastrophic services (such as cardiovascular surgery) and common, low cost services (such as urine tests) . 204 The regulator can also attempt to assure that policies provide at least a basic level of coverage corresponding to the expectations of most insureds. Another recent Chilean regulation requires insurers to cover at least 25% of the cost of any procedure covered by FONASA. 205 Though it is too early to judge the effects of these forms of regulation, it is possible to judge from Chile's past experience that largely unregulated markets are highly problematic.
C. The Possibility of Technology Transfers
The United States has developed, in the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a sophisticated and effective mechanism for promoting the sharing of information among the states with respect to approaches to regulating insurance. 2 0 6 The NAIC acts as a clearinghouse, developing draft statutes and regulations that can be used as models by state legislatures and University of Michigan Journal of Law Refom[ regulators.°7 It is possible, however, that we can learn not only from approaches developed domestically but also from those developed by other nations with private health insurance industries.
Chile has created its own devices, noted above, for bringing transparency to the insurance market and for limiting the use by insurers of certain contract clauses. Perhaps the most interesting tool developed by the SISP, from a U.S. perspective, is its system for hearing health insurance complaints. A central issue in our debate about managed care has been the crafting of systems for handling complaints and appeals. There is much to learn here from the Chilean system.
Any insured who feels aggrieved by his or her insurer may complain to the SISP. These complaints may be presented in writing, by telephone, in person, or by email. 0 8 During 1997, the SISP received 46,835 complaints and questions from consumers. 2 0 9 The consumer department of the Audit Division of the Superintendency initially reviews these -complaints and questions. 1 Many of them are either not within the jurisdiction of the SISP (e.g., they pertain to issues such as the level of insurance premiums, over which the SISP has no jurisdiction, or sick leave denials, which are the responsibility of another agency) or are easily-clarified misunderstandings. 1 Serious complaints are forwarded to the arbitration division of the legal department. 2 1 2 In 1997, 698 complaints were resolved by the legal department. 21 3 The complaints are first sent to the insurer, who has three business days (or up to five continuous days) to provide the SISP with both its response to the complaint and any relevant documentary evidence. 1 The burden of proof in complaint cases normally rests with the insurer, so insurers have reason to respond promptly and thoroughly.
Responding to complaints is a major responsibility of the legal departments of in-surers. 1 6 Once the SISP receives a complaint, it is assigned to an attorney of the legal department of the SISP for investigation. 7 In most instances evidence is taken in writing, except when necessary witnesses are interviewed or examined. 2 18 Each party may respond to statements of the other party as long as either party has further statements to make. 2 9 The complaint and responses are then reviewed by the staff attorney assigned to the complaint, who develops a written analysis of the case and recommended solution. 2 2 0 The SISP has three full-time and one part-time physician on staff who assist with medical questions raised by the complaints, such as whether a medical condition preexisted the policy. 22 ' Specialists may also be consulted if necessary. 222 Once the investigation process is complete, the complaint, response, analysis, and recommendation are reviewed by a committee consisting of the attorney who worked up the case, the physician who assisted (if one did), the head of the legal department, and representatives of the audit and research departments.121 This committee comes up with a proposed decision for the complaint. The Superintendent ultimately reviews every complaint personally and may either adopt the proposed resolution or craft 224 his own response.
If the complaint is resolved against the insurer, the insurer must comply with the resolution ordered by the SISP. In some cases, the SISP issues small damage awards in the form of "interest" on the insured. 25 In 1997, 698 cases were resolved amount due the inue . n19,68cse eersle through the arbitration process. 26 Twenty-five percent were won 216. The General Counsel of Banmtdica estimated that responding to complaints consumed 80% of the time of her three lawyer legal staff. See Interview with Anna Maria Rubio, supra note 214.
217. There are five attorneys assigned to this task within the SISP. See Interview with Andrea Mufioz Sanchez, supra note 212.
218. See id. This is particularly likely to occur where the complainant claims that the insurance salesman made oral misrepresentations. In these cases the salesperson may be interviewed. If oral testimony is taken, the attorneys of the parties may cross-examine, though usually only the insurer will have an attorney. If the salesperson denies the claims, the claimant will usually lose, as the claimant must usually sign the policy application stating that he has read and understood the policy and will be bound by this statement in the absence of admissions that representations contrary to the policy were made. See Interview with Fernando Riveros Vidal, supra note 71.
219 The insurer may contest the decision in court but must essentially prove misconduct on the part of the SISP to prevail. 8
Decisions are in fact rarely appealed. 2 2 The appellate decisions of the SISP are published annually to inform insurers of the position of the SISP on various issues.°T he arbitration process is quite time-consuming, lasting six months or more. 2 3 ' The process is, however, free to the insured and is often the best means of resolving problems with insurers. Moreover, if the complaint is directed at termination of the insured, the • 1232
insurer must continue coverage until the complaint is resolved. One of the most important characteristics of this process is that in responding to complaints the SISP is not limited to the strict letter of the statute, regulations, and contract, but has equitable 233 powers to resolve complaints fairly. Under the law, for example, there is nothing to forbid an insurer from raising the premiums of a particular plan as long as the insurer does so equally for all per-• 234 sons insured under the plan. As noted above, however, insurers can escape this requirement by offering new plans to insureds with favorable claims experience and then raising premiums dramatically for persons insured under the plan with less favorable claims experience who are left behind. Persons whose rates have thus been dramatically increased may complain to the SISP. The SISP S23 5
has been willing to consider the equity of these rate increases. In a case where an insured is effectively a "captive" to the insurer because her medical condition makes her otherwise uninsurable, the proposed rate increase is substantial, and the financial situation of the insurer does not make an increase necessary, the SISP has been willing to reject the increase and propose a reasonable price in-236 crease given the situation. In effect, the regulator has honored [VOL. 32:4
Managed Care Regulation the "reasonable expectations" of insureds that they would not be singled out for excessive premium increases, just as American courts have often honored "reasonable expectations" to curb insurer overreaching. 3 7 The complaint procedure is not exclusive, and insureds may go to court if they choose. 2 3 There is in fact an expedited judicial procedure in Chile for challenging violations of constitutional rights, and insureds have used this procedure effectively to challenge insurance company actions that allegedly violate the constitutional right to health care. 3 9 Court proceedings are more costly, however, because an attorney is required, and the vast majority of insureds choose to bring their complaints to the SISP. 24 0
There is much to commend this model as a managed care complaint procedure. Particular features of the procedure-the placement of the burden of proof on the insurer, the use of an interdisciplinary team to review complaints, the vesting ultimate decisionmaking power in an official who is both politically accountable and also responsible for assuring the solvency of insurers, the availability of equitable power as well as legal, and the publication of decisions for future consideration-all would be useful in a managed care setting. These ideas should give us food for thought as we craft our own procedures for regulating managed care.
D. Rejlecting on Our Responsibility
In his recent movie of the same name, Michael Moore suggests that the United States be renamed "The Big One, 24 ' reflecting our position on the world stage. Though the overall situation of our health care system-the highest health care costs in the world combined with the lowest rate of insurance coverage of any developed nation-gives other nations little to envy, there is a great deal of interest worldwide in our managed care developments. For better or worse, a number of nations are developing various managed Because Chile has a well-developed private health insurance industry and a strong commitment to a free-market economy, and because it is generally open to new ideas and institutions, it is possible that managed care will develop quickly in Chile. As noted above, some ISAPREs have already begun to develop managed care systems. We have discovered in the United States that institutions that have been developed for regulating fee-for-service insurance are not adequate for responding to the issues raised by managed care. That is the reason for this symposium. In particular, a much more sophisticated capacity for evaluating medical decisions of insurers is necessary when the main threat that an insurance regulator must address is underservice.
At the time this Article was written, Chile was just beginning to think about how to regulate managed care. 2 4 ' Legislative and regulatory efforts at the federal and state level, as well as a torrent of academic publications and conferences such as this symposium, suggest that we are further along in working through this problem. As we begin to solve this regulatory problem, we need to make our solutions broadly available. We should find ways to involve entities that work with health care systems throughout the world, such as the World Health Organization, the Pan American Health Organization, or the World Bank, in these dissemination efforts. CONCLUSION The task of designing institutions and programs to regulate managed care is essential, but formidable. Though comparative law and policy studies may not be able to contribute much to this task, they can contribute something. When tackling such a difficult and important task, we need to accept help wherever we can find it. The experience of other nations, such as Chile, can help us gain perspective both on the context and the importance of our task, and perhaps suggest tools that we can use to accomplish it.
242. See Interview with Andrea Mufioz Sanchez, supra note 212.
[VOL. 32:4
